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The festivities marking the withdrawal of the last Russian troops from Germany on 
August 31, 1994, had barely come to a close when Russian Defense Minister Gen. 
Pavel Grachev stated that "...the optimum period for withdrawing...would have been l5 
years."(1) He considered the decision to pull out the Western Group Forces (WGF) 
within only four years "...the crudest political blunder."(2) In light of these statements, 
and their reference to social problems in the Russian military such as the housing 
shortage for returning troops, it is remarkable that the withdrawal of the WGF from 
Germany was completed four months ahead of the original schedule set in the "Two-
Plus-Four Treaty" of 1990.
One explanation for Russia's scrupulous fulfillment of the withdrawal schedule is the 
substantial compensation of DM 7.8 billion agreed to by the Federal Republic in 1990. 
In December 1992 Helmut Kohl agreed to supplement the original sum with DM 550 
million if Boris Yel'tsin moved the deadline from the end of 1994 to August 31, 1994.(3) 
The Russian observation of this agreement allowed the chancellor to take credit for the 
completed withdrawal under his auspices about six weeks before the critical Bundestag 
elections.
Even though Germany's considerable financial support of the withdrawal was a strong 
incentive for Moscow to meet the August 1994 deadline, other factors also may have 
motivated Russian compliance. One such factor may have been the Russian intention 
to leave open the door for the possibility of close economic and political cooperation 
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with Germany, a relationship with historical precedent despite stark ideological 
differences.
The observation "...that the West as political reality has become a fiction..." and that 
"...the system of Western alliances...continues to exist more by virtue of...inertia than 
because of political necessity" encouraged Igor Maksimychev, departmental head of 
European security at the Europe Institute of the Moscow Academy of Sciences, to 
recommend a Russian foreign policy focused on cooperation with the Federal Republic.
(4)
Maksimychev's conclusion that the establishment of a European security system "...is a 
challenge first and foremost for the Germans and the Russians,"(5) constitutes a 
Russian reaction to Western European disunity, NATO's difficulties in defining its post-
Cold War mission, and the prospect of weaker trans-Atlantic ties. The suggestion of a 
Russo-German inspired security system indicates a Russian interest in Germany's 
return to its pre-World War II Mittellage--the free-floating position between East and 
West.
Given the Russian Federation's preoccupation with the "Near Abroad" for the last two 
years, the relations between Moscow and Bonn have encompassed mostly economic 
issues and the withdrawal of the WGF. In other words, the reassertion of Moscow's 
dominance over the newly independent republics impeded a proactive foreign policy 
towards Central Europe.
As Russia, encouraged by Western complacency, approaches the goal of consolidating 
its control over the CIS, Moscow's foreign policy is likely to devote more attention to the 
"Far Abroad." Should such a policy shift be directed at Germany along the lines 
suggested by Maksimychev, then the conscientious withdrawal of the WGF could be 
interpreted as a preparation, during Russia's preoccupation with the "Near Abroad," for 
close Russo-German cooperation. The view of the WGF withdrawal as a precursor for a 
qualitative change in Russo-German relations was expressed by President Yel'tsin on 
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the day before the completion of the pullout: "There are no big unresolved 
issues...between Russia and Germany.... Our joint effort has helped to set up a solid 
groundwork for taking bilateral co-operation on a new level."(6)
For Russia the attractiveness of pursuing close bilateral ties with Germany is not only 
based on the promise of economic benefits, but also on its compatibility with the current 
Russian foreign policy. At least since September 1993, when Yel'tsin reversed his 
position on tolerating the NATO membership of Poland and the Czech Republic, 
Moscow's foreign policy consistently aimed at the prevention of NATO's expansion into 
East-Central Europe. If Russia, in cooperation with Germany, took on the challenge of 
establishing a European security system, as Maksimychev recommends, the 
"containment" of the North Atlantic Alliance would be realized, since NATO would have 
to be diluted to a degree where it would lose its effectiveness.
Even though the punctuality of the Russian withdrawal from Germany may indicate an 
open door for Bonn to establish a close relationship with Moscow, it is unlikely that the 
Federal Republic will follow such a path. Only nine days after the withdrawal of the 
WGF, German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe expressed his resistance against NATO's 
dilution by stating: "Russia just doesn't qualify...to be integrated into the Brussels 
structure... [I]t would blow NATO apart, it would be like the United Nations of Europe...." 
In contrast to the repeatedly asserted Russian opposition against NATO's expansion, 
Ruehe stated on the same occasion that he could envision the NATO membership of 
some or all members of the Visegrad Group (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia) before the year 2000.(7)
This bold statement by Defense Minister Ruehe in September 1994 was of great 
significance not only because it underlined Germany's role as a strong proponent of the 
Visegrad Group's admission to NATO, but also because it constituted a challenge to the 
American leadership of NATO on a fundamental security issue: Ruehe's comments, 
which revived the discussion on NATO's admissions policy, put into question the 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program.
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This program, devised by the Clinton Administration late in 1993 after Moscow's open 
resistance to NATO's expansion, was intended to appease the states interested in 
NATO membership without alienating Russia. In order to achieve this task, PfP offered 
its members military cooperation with NATO states and an oblique hint at eventual 
NATO membership. The result of this compromise was dissatisfaction on both sides: 
Moscow assaulted the view of "...the Partnership for Peace program as a kind of 
preparatory program for joining NATO," as Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev put it,(8) 
while the countries interested in NATO membership complained about the lack of clear 
criteria for full alliance membership and insufficient Western commitment.(9)
Given Russia's stern opposition to NATO's eastward expansion, Bonn faced the 
prospect of a lasting security vacuum along its eastern border. In such a situation 
Germany would remain indefinitely "...the eastern frontier state of the western zone of 
prosperity [which] ...feel[s] the effects of instability most immediately," as Ruehe put it in 
October 1993.(10) The desire to end the "frontline status" of the Federal Republic, 
combined with an open ear for the concerns of the Visegrad Group, may have 
motivated Ruehe's challenge of the NATO admissions policy.
A noteworthy aspect of Ruehe's initiative is the date of his statement (September 9, 
1994): nine days after the WGF withdrawal and one day after the pullout of the Western 
Powers. This date suggests that the time of his comments was carefully chosen to 
prevent a disruption of the symbolically important withdrawal ceremonies. Considering 
that these high-profile ceremonies took place during Kohl's campaign for the October 
16, 1994 Bundestag elections, any critical reaction from the withdrawing powers had to 
be prevented (especially after having paid half a billion marks for the Russian 
withdrawal in August 1994).
Since Ruehe's initiative conflicted with Moscow's foreign policy and constituted a 
challenge to the American PfP concept, critical reactions had to be expected. Therefore, 
the safest time for his statement was after the conclusion of both withdrawal 
ceremonies. The fact that Ruehe's revival of the discussion on NATO admissions 
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occurred at the first opportunity which could no longer affect the ceremonies, that is, the 
day after the Western withdrawal, indicated a considerable degree of urgency in Bonn 
about this issue.
Ruehe's denial of Russian NATO membership and his support for the admission of the 
Visegrad states by the year 2000 triggered a reserved American reaction. Defense 
Secretary William Perry, who was present during Ruehe's statement, was neither 
prepared to reject Russia's entry into the alliance nor able to foresee NATO membership  
of the former Warsaw Pact in the near future.(11) Although the American reluctance 
regarding Ruehe's position continued to be displayed at least until early October 1994, a 
reconsideration of the US standpoint on the alliance's admissions policy was underway.
By the end of October the Clinton Administration openly acknowledged the insufficiency 
of the PfP in addressing the security concerns of East-Central Europe. To remedy this 
situation, for the December meeting of NATO's Foreign Ministers, a working group 
under Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke is preparing a discussion of the 
political and military criteria for the admission of the East-Central European states into 
NATO within three to five years. With a simultaneous boost of the CSCE in the area of 
conflict resolution and peacekeeping, Washington intends to calm Moscow's objections 
to a NATO expansion which excludes the Russian Federation.(12)
Although the American policy shift largely reflects the content of Ruehe's statement in 
early September, it is doubtful that Washington's abandonment of the PfP was a direct 
result of the German action. Such a course correction by the Clinton Administration 
away from one of its major foreign policy programs probably was being contemplated in 
Washington already before Ruehe expressed his concern.
Thus, the German leadership in the revived discussion of NATO's expansion may have 
consisted primarily of testing the Russian reaction to a highly sensitive issue before the 
US would follow. At the same time, Bonn's impetus signaled to Moscow the German 
dedication to an undiluted Atlantic Alliance. That is to say, Bonn indicated that it has no 
5
intention of returning to the Mittellage--a policy which may have motivated an aspirant 
for the position of Russian Defense Minister, Lt. Gen. Lebed, to flatter the German 
Chancellor by calling him a "...wise person both as a theoretician and as a man of 
action: in our country only Lenin was as capable as Kohl."(13)
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